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Authority in Intimations of Global Law 
PATRICK CAPPS* 
 
Introduction 
In this essay, I explore the distinction between voluntas and ratio in Neil 
Walker’s Intimations of Global Law,1 and consider how that distinction is 
employed in relation to the ‘claim to authority that global law entails’:2 that 
is the sufficient reasons why individual citizens, the institution of a state, or 
the state itself, should subordinate their choice of action so as to conform to 
the action-guiding directives of the various bodies that comprise the 
institutions of global law. Specifically, my argument is that Walker does not 
appreciate the full role of dissent within the global legal order as a critical 
means by which authority, rooted in a universal set of ‘core moral concerns’ 
for the protection of basic rights and autonomy (which he calls ratio), can 
be authentically accumulated within global law.  
 
His claims on this matter emerge towards the end of Intimations, but 
emerge from his discussion of the species of global law, which forms the 
core of his book. Walker argues that there are seven species of global law. 
Each species is a ‘partial vision’ or ‘perspective’ on the ‘actually existing 
global configuration in all its multipolar, interlocking complexity.’3 What is 
the ‘existing global configuration’ and what specifically is a ‘species’ of 
global law?  
 
The ‘existing global configuration’ 
Description of Walker’s understanding of the ‘existing global 
configuration’—his object of inquiry—is not easy. This is because much of 
his discussion is a sophisticated dissection of how other theorists have 
presented interpretations of what they consider is essential or ephemeral,4 or 
what is dangerous or emancipatory, about the existing features of the global 
                                                          
* School of Law, University of Bristol. This review is based upon a discussion paper 
presented at Queen Mary University of London. Thanks to Richard Collins, Clair Gamage, 
Cian Murphy, Akis Psygkas, Julian Rivers and Jane Rooney for providing comments on 
earlier drafts of this essay.  
1 Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015. Hereafter 
Intimations) 
2 Intimations, 148. 
3 Intimations, 136. 
4 See Richard Collins, ‘The Slipperiness of “Global Law”’ (2017) 37 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 714-739.  
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legal landscape. As a result, the actual features of this landscape tend to be 
hidden, or implied, within his discussion. However, these interpretative 
efforts all seek to ‘make sense’ of a real empirical phenomenon that is the 
‘existing global configuration’. This configuration itself, if not Walker’s 
understanding of it, can be set out fairly easily.  
 
In the last few decades there has been an explosion in the number of 
global regulatory bodies. Each of these bodies has a reach that is not 
jurisdictionally restricted to the territory or nationals of one state. A further 
characteristic of these bodies is that they have specific and specialised 
regulatory mandates to, for example, regulate human rights, peace and 
security or global or regional markets. The term global administrative law 
has been coined by scholars in university research centres in New York and 
Heidelberg to describe collectively the regulatory regimes that these bodies 
operate.5 Some of these bodies are constituted by multilateral treaties (e.g. 
the United Nations), while others are intergovernmental networks of either 
domestic regulators (e.g. the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)6) or 
private actors (e.g. GLOBALG.A.P., whose membership is dominated by 
European producers and retailers of agricultural produce, and which sets 
ostensibly voluntary standards for the safety certification of agricultural 
production processes;7 or the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC), which 
operates a global certification body for sustainable timber products8). The 
public/private distinction is a useful way of categorising how these bodies 
are constituted (and this may be significant when questions of authority are 
considered)9 but it says little, in my view, about how they actually govern. 
For example, private bodies such as those just mentioned have governance 
                                                          
5 See, for example, http://www.iilj.org/gal/ and http://www.mpil.de/de/pub/forschung/nach-
rechtsgebieten/voelkerrecht/ipa.cfm 
6 The ESRB was established by the European Commission (in light of a report by the 
Larosière Group) to coordinate the policies of various bodies (for example, EU states and 
their central banks) to help ameliorate the risks of another global banking crisis. For a full 
description and discussion of this body see E Ferran and K Alexander, ‘Can Soft Law 
Bodies be Effective? The Special Case of the European Systemic Risk Board’ (2010) 
European Law Review 751-776. 
7 See N Hachez and J Wouters, ‘A Glimpse at the Democratic Legitimacy of Private 
Standards: Assessing the Public Accountability of GLOBALG.A.P.’ (2011) 14 Journal of 
International Economic Law 677-710 at 682. 
8 See E Meidinger, ‘The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The 
Case of Forestry’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 47-87.  
9 R. Stewart, ‘Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, 
Participation, and Responsiveness’ (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law 211 
at 212. 
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structures that are very similar to those found within state administrative 
agencies, and they normally seek to regulate important public goods (in the 
examples used above, global food safety or sustainable forestry). There are 
now many thousand bodies like these according to those who have engaged 
in sustained empirical analysis of the field.10 
 
Another important feature of the ‘existing global configuration’ is 
the formal or informal links or relations between the abovementioned global 
administrative bodies. For example, the judgments of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in Kadi11and the European Court of Human Rights in 
Nada,12 have found that the implementation of freezing orders made by the 
UN 1267 Sanctions Committee by states, constitute a violation of 
fundamental rights. These cases help to make the point that the ‘existing 
global configuration’ is a system of sorts,13 which also includes, for 
example, state domestic courts, and actors such as multinational law firms 
and international commercial arbitrators, and not simply a set of disparate 
bodies. This should come as no surprise, but leads to numbers of these 
bodies seeking to regulate the same activity of the same actor, and so 
questions of competence and hierarchy, which are resolved through formal 
constitutions in state legal orders in a domestic context, quickly arise. There 
is, though, no unified multilateral system of global governance based upon 
fixed, shared and progressive ‘community interests’ and hierarchical 
suprastate governance as is suggested by Bruno Simma.14 The more 
accurate picture is given by Richard Stewart, who writes that ‘…[a]uthority 
is dispersed among a myriad of distinct administrative regimes pursuing 
                                                          
10 See Intimations, 34, and also see, for example, T. Aalberts, Constructing Sovereignty 
between Politics and Law (Routledge, 2012) and A von Bogdandy, P Dann and M 
Goldmann, ‘Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal 
Framework for Global Governance Activities’ (2008) 11 German Law Journal 1375-1400. 
11 1 Case C–402/05 P and C–4p15/05, P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351. 
12 Case of Nada v Switzerland (Application no 10593/08) (2012) European Court of Human 
Rights. This judgment directly invokes the judgment in Kadi.  
13 By ‘system’, I mean something close to Walker’s characterisation of a distinctive feature 
of globalisation: ‘…each dimension should possess its own developmental logic, and each 
its own trajectory, with all connected through circuits of mutual influence rather than lines 
of unilateral determination.’ (Intimations, 8 and see also discussion of Rosenau’s definition 
of globalisation at 14n36). Like Walker, I do not presume here that a system of global law 
can only be conceived of as being structured by a foundational constitution, or as able to 
perform set or agreed functions, in ways that may be aspired to by administrative bodies in 
a state legal order.   
14 B Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 250 
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 217. 
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specialized tasks without any overarching authorities or arrangements for 
supervision, accountability, coordination or correction.’15  
 
‘Species’ of global law 
Turning now to Walker’s ‘species’ of global law, he claims that each offers 
a ‘partial vision’ or ‘perspective’, which reflects various cognitive interests 
in the ‘actually existing global configuration’ just described. He identifies 
seven species of global law (these are: structural, formal, abstract-
normative, historical-discursive, laterally co-ordinate, functionally specific 
and hybrid). A detailed description of them is found in Intimations and need 
not be re-rehearsed here, except as necessary to illustrate Walker’s claims. 
What is more important is what he thinks these species in general are, or 
what they do: what does each ‘species’ (qua ‘partial vision’ or 
‘perspective’) reveal about the ‘existing global configuration’?  Here are 
four possibilities of what might be revealed, and each is found within the 
pages of Intimations.  
 
First, ‘species’ might reveal nothing directly about the ‘global 
configuration’, but instead could just be a way of categorising 
commensurate theories. What Walker might mean by ‘species’, then, are 
groups of theories that are commensurable in the simple sense that they 
share various claims about the ‘existing global configuration’. Different 
‘species’, by contrast, are incommensurable. For instance, and to take two 
sub-species of global law, it is probably the case that a theory or claim that 
global law reflects a hierarchical vision of global constitutionalism (that 
resemble those forms of constitutionalism found in nation states) is 
incommensurable with a flat legal pluralistic vision (which means that 
global bodies do not stand in a formal hierarchical relationship with others). 
While this may make sense given the normal use of the word ‘species’, 
Walker appears to reject a hard-nosed version of this definition. It is more 
likely that his view is that species of global law share ‘family 
resemblances’.16  
 
Second, species could be understood to mean different interpretative 
perspectives. Each species is a focal perspective from which the ‘existing 
                                                          
15  See note 9, at, 212. 
16 Intimations, 199; L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (4th ed., Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009, first published in 1963). 
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global institutional configuration’ is to be interpreted. For example, the 
‘structural’ species of global law adopts a focal perspective that leads us to 
interpret the UN Charter at the apex of a hierarchical order built upon 
various universal fundamental values. By contrast, the ‘laterally co-
ordinate’ species of global law is a perspective which interprets the same 
aspects of the Charter system differently as part of a flatter, pluralist, and 
overlapping landscape of separate global legal bodies or systems.  
  
Third, species could be means. Although Intimations is 
‘predominately empirical and explanatory’,17 there is a discussion of a range 
of normative approaches in the book. Where the discussion turns normative, 
the various species present models of global law that are instrumentally 
rational ideal-types which allow various ends described by theories of 
global justice to be achieved.18 They explain, then, what ought to change in 
the global configuration so that it can become a just global order. So, for 
example, it could be argued that the forms of the ‘structural’ species may be 
instrumentally rational to effectively institutionalise human rights and the 
rule of law globally.  
 
Fourth, and related to the third possibility, species might represent 
models of authority in global law. Global law is generally a form of 
coercive ordering, which means that the bodies which enforce it have means 
available to them to restrict the choices of those subject to their attempts to 
order.19 Even those bodies that seem to be entirely private enterprises which 
seek to form various rule-based regulatory functions (such as 
GLOBALG.A.P.) can be coercive as they are able to deny access to markets 
and harm the well-being of those to whom their attempts at regulation are 
directed. To the extent that global law is genuinely law, and not simply 
despotic rule, its claim to order must be justified. On this reading, the 
species of global law offer different justifications (e.g. an appeal to human 
rights, rule of law or expert knowledge) for some of the authority claims of 
various bodies that comprise it.   
 
                                                          
17 Intimations, 27. 
18 For a discussion of Walker’s views, see Intimations, 136. 
19 See P Capps, ‘Legal Idealism and Global Law’, in P Capps and SD Pattinson (eds), 
Ethical Rationalism and the Law (Hart, 2017) at 213. 
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For Walker, the choice of ‘species’ depends upon the ‘problem 
posed’ and ‘question asked’.20 We might think of the ‘question’ or 
‘problem’ in terms of the four different possibilities outlined. A closer fit to 
the ‘institutional configuration’ could lead us to select one interpretative 
perspective over another (so, a laterally co-ordinate sub-species of the 
‘divergent approach’,21 which sometimes defends pluralism, might better 
explain the existing configuration, and its historical origins, than species 
that emphasise a fixed constitutional hierarchy). Alternatively, if our 
question is one of justice, we can consider which ‘species’, as an 
institutional form, is best able to achieve a particular vision of justice (for 
example, if justice requires toleration of the values of others, then a 
pluralistic institutional form might be instrumentally rational). Furthermore, 
if our problem is about authority within  the ‘existing global configuration’, 
then we should be able to show why global bodies, within which decisions 
are taken by experts, accumulate authority, or whether that authority can 
only properly arise if their authority rests upon deliberative procedures.  
 
The various ways in which the word ‘species’ is employed within 
Intimations, does suggest an eclectic and diverse range of plausible ways of 
employing theory to explain or justify the ‘existing global configuration’. 
This openness, ‘expansiveness’22 or ‘capaciousness’23 is an important 
feature of Walker’s book. However, the foregoing discussion indicates that 
the value we attach to each ‘species’ depends upon its quality in solving 
particular problems or answering specific questions. Of these, it is my view 
that some questions or problems are more significant than others, and some 
are of critical importance.  
 
The most critical question for which an answer should be sought is 
why, if at all, the ‘existing global configuration’ can be considered an 
authoritative form of governance?24 An answer to this question provides the 
reason why global bodies should be treated as authentically authoritative, 
offer weak or no reasons for compliance, or are better understood as an 
abuse of power that should be resisted. To elaborate, should we treat the 
                                                          
20 Intimations, 137. 
21 Intimations, 106-118. 
22 See Collins, note 4, above at 718.  
23 Ibid, and D Kenny, ‘Book Review: Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014)’ (2015) 63 American Journal of Comparative Law 1053 at 1055.  
24 See P Capps, note 19, above.  
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decisions of the Security Council Sanctions Committee as authoritative, for 
instance, to the extent that those decisions are intra vires of powers afforded 
to the Council by the UN Charter, which is, in turn, rooted in state consent? 
Alternatively, should we disregard its decisions because that Committee 
fails to govern in the ‘right way’ (because, for instance, its mechanisms fail 
against basic standards of administrative justice or fundamental human 
rights more broadly)? If its decision should be disregarded, should we seek 
to challenge its decisions directly or indirectly in other institutions (such as 
Mr Kadi’s challenge before the CJEU)? Walker’s Intimations does suggest 
answers to these ‘questions asked’.  
 
Intimations of authority 
Walker first sets up the problem of authority in global law. Forms of global 
law had previously relied upon the ‘sovereigntist’ conception of authority, 
which is built upon state consent. Given the description of the ‘existing 
global configuration’ set out above, he is correct to claim that this 
conception ‘no longer dominates as it once did’.25 Why is this? Others have 
offered evidence of a significant ‘autonomisation’ of various global bodies 
(especially courts), which claim competences that go some distance beyond 
the sometimes under-specified and general treaty provisions upon which 
they are constituted.26 As has already been pointed out, we also see the 
emergence of bodies that are ‘private’, and unconnected to ‘sovereigntist 
conceptions’ of global law, such as GLOBAL.G.A.P or the FSC. We might 
then surmise that the emergent ‘global institutional configuration’ is a form 
of effective, coercive, regulation, but, at least in part, it cannot plausibly 
have authority against the ‘sovereigntist’ conception of authority.27   
 
From these observations, it might be said that the problem with the 
developments just mentioned is that according to the ‘sovereigntist’ 
conception (or at least a ‘republican’ version of it28), the appropriation of 
interpretative powers or law-making competences by international courts, 
and the emergence of private global regulation, is nothing more than an 
attempt by the powerful actors to insulate themselves from significant 
                                                          
25 Intimations, 163.  
26 For discussion of some of the relevant literature, see the introduction to P Capps and HP 
Olsen (eds), Legal Authority Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
27 Intimations, 205. 
28 See P Capps, ‘The Evolution of Global Law’, in above at note 26.  
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public control or oversight.29 But this position seems too extreme because, 
first, we should not presume that the powers assumed by international courts 
to interpret and create law necessarily indicate that they are necessarily 
unconcerned with the rule of law or other fundamental values; second, it 
seems inappropriate in many ways to afford global bodies authority just 
because various (sometimes morally dubious) states have consented to be 
bound to them; and, third, it is the case that many private regulatory bodies 
do adopt regulatory structures that adhere to values such as transparency and 
accountability, and they often seek, in good faith, to regulate important 
public goods such as food safety or sustainable forestry.30 Intimations 
provides an interesting response to these difficulties.  
 
The tone of Walker’s discussion of the authority has, embedded 
within the seven species of global law, a pluralist ring to it. He writes that of 
the species of global law that purport to replace the sovereigntist model, 
‘none…can claim to supply an authoritative meta-principle for a 
transnational age in a similar fashion and similar extent’.31 Elsewhere he 
writes: ‘…new global law does not specify any particular source or 
pedigree, and so may account for itself in many different ways and may 
claim or assume authority on many different grounds.’32 There is, instead, a 
plurality of normative bases for authority claimed by different global bodies, 
and the species of global law, in one sense, are generalisations of those 
claims. But while this might be empirically true—and, as mentioned, 
Walker’s book is ‘predominately empirical and explanatory rather than 
normative and predictive’33—a question Walker faces towards the end of 
Intimations is why any of these authority claims may be justified.  
 
While, as a matter of fact, Walker adopts a pluralist approach in 
describing authority claims in global law, in the last chapter of Intimations, 
he does offer a tantalising glimpse of a justification for authority. His 
answer seeks to move beyond empirical and taxonomical claims about 
                                                          
29 See also Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political 
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 60 Stanford Law Review 
595-631. 
30 See also S Bernstein & E Hannah, ‘Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: 
Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space’ (2008) 11 Journal of International 
Economic Law 575-608. 
31 Intimations, 164.  
32 Intimations, 19 and also see 21. 
33 Intimations, 27. 
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authority: it does not mistake the fact of pluralism as implying the 
endorsement of a pluralist normative vision of authority,34 even though 
when considering such questions he recognises that we must take the world 
as we find it.35 Instead, he argues that while global law is institutionally 
diverse and pluralistic, there is emerging from that diversity a ‘consensus’ 
or ‘common sense’ of global law which is able to ground its authority.36 
 
He then argues that the relationship between consensus and diversity 
just described rests upon the distinction between global law as ratio (ie it 
exhibits a specific but universal rationality) and voluntas (ie it is an 
expression of human will), and both can be said to provide bases for 
justified authority claims in global law. The species of global law seem to 
now become normative responses to the problem of justifying authority. 
Each tends to fall either side of the distinction between ratio and voluntas:37 
for example, the appeal to the rule of law by the formal species of global 
law reflects ratio, whereas the structural species (in which consent is the 
basis for the building of global constitutional structures) appeals to voluntas.  
  
Walker argues that, quite often, and as a matter of fact, global law 
appeals to ratio, rather than voluntas: there is a ‘preponderance of ratio’, 
which he understands is ‘an encouraging sign’, in that it indicates that global 
law is not simply a ‘patchwork of difference’.38 Thus, global law is 
becoming wedded to ‘certain core moral concerns’ rather than being 
characterised by pluralistic value diversity. What substantively does he 
recognise as these core moral concerns? The examples he gives on the third 
from last page of Intimations are respect for ‘basic rights’, ‘autonomy’ and 
the protection of ‘diverse life chances’.39  
 
These values form the basis of a range of possible theories of 
authority.  First, authority could be claimed on a Razian basis: the authority 
of global law arises if one is better able to conform to Walker’s core moral 
concerns by acting in accordance with global law’s directives, than to act 
                                                          
34 This is a move which Nico Krisch seeks to make (See N Krisch, Beyond 
Constitutionalism (OUP, 2010) and P Capps and D Machin, ‘The Problem of Global Law’ 
(2011) 74 Modern Law Review 794-810. 
35 Intimations, 136. 
36 Intimations, 196. 
37 Intimations, 197. 
38 Intimations, 197. 
39 Intimations, 203.  
 10 
 
otherwise.40 Second, those values might be formal (eg connected to the rule 
of law) and so officials can justifiably claim authority because they afford 
sufficient respect for the autonomy of those they govern when those 
officials ‘play by the rules’.41 Third, respect for autonomy and diverse life 
chances may be respected through deliberative and democratic institutions. 
Thus, the authority of global law arises because those subject to the law 
have consented to it in some way.42 One could be picky about how Walker’s 
core moral concerns give rise to justified authority claims in these three 
ways, but it should be recognised that these positions are often held as 
mutually interdependent (an obvious example would be found in Dworkin’s 
Law’s Empire43).  
 
Moving now to voluntas, he argues that the absence of the 
hierarchical features of state constitutions, and global law’s general 
heterarchical or unranked general structure or character, means that legal 
techniques orientated towards ‘agreement or compromise’ are preponderant. 
So, it seems that not only is global law developing universal ratio, and it 
should do this, but this develops from a pluralist institutional structure that 
accommodates, and mediates between, real competing political wills and 
social forces. The authority of institutions that rely upon universal ratio 
does not emerge by reference to an external moral source, but instead 
emerges immanently from the interactions between bodies within the 
‘existing global configuration’.44 This appears to be some sort of modern 
restatement of classical ‘sovereigntist’ thinking about authority applied to 
the post-national global institutional landscape. But unlike the traditional 
model, the global bodies that form this landscape adopt informal procedures 
and standards, linked to values such as accommodation and compromise, 
which allow  ‘contestation’ to be settled between global bodies (specifically, 
how ‘multiple partial claims to authority can be kept alive’45). From these 
procedures emerges the product which is ratio, but, as mentioned above, 
                                                          
40 See generally J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, 1986) ch 2.  
41 This is close to the position taken by J Brunnee and S Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
42 This is an approach broadly endorsed by T Christiano in ‘Democratic Legitimacy and 
International Institutions’ and P Pettit in ‘Legitimate International Institutions: A Neo-
Republican Perspective’ in S Besson and J Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
43 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986). 
44 Intimations. 199. 
45 Intimations, 189.  
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ratio also seems to have an intrinsic justification. How do the processes 
described by voluntas give rise to ratio? 
 
To explain, the origins of Walker’s view in Intimations are found in 
his earlier work, where he developed a theory called ‘constitutional 
pluralism’. In it, he rejects both radical pluralism and hierarchical 
constitutionalism.46 When rejecting both, he argues for a model of global 
law based upon the constitutionalisation of plural communities and 
regulatory bodies within a flat, heterarchical institutional structure. The 
capacity of bodies to be open to, and to challenge, other views (which are 
valuable procedural attributes of bodies) in turn leads to the genuine cross-
fertilisation of ideas, and the generation of genuine common values. If we 
now consider the full quotation where he discusses ‘certain core moral 
concerns’ at the end of Intimations, Walker seems to think that it is these 
procedural features of the pluralistic landscape generate a universal ratio: 
 
For global law as process, in directly tracking global law’s other and 
secondary template as voluntas, should nevertheless remain closely 
linked to law as ratio, not just in terms of patterns of interactive and 
combinatory compatibility, but also in terms of possessing in common 
certain core moral concerns, often articulated in language of basic 
rights, to respect autonomy and protect diverse life chances wherever 
these desiderata are at issue of under challenge.47  
 
So, global law is simultaneously pluralistic, responsive to social and 
political values, while not dismissing, and, indeed, generating, global legal 
norms consistent with his ‘core moral concerns’. This is how authority is 
generated in global law for Walker. 
 
Walker underplays an important feature of the pluralistic landscape, 
which can be revealed by considering the Kadi case further. One general 
factual observation of the various legal judgments is that they required 
consideration of legal norms produced by multiple legal sites (such as the 
human rights provisions in the EU treaties, Security Council Resolutions, 
Sanctions Committee decisions and also domestic and European primary 
                                                          
46 Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317-
359. 
47 Intimations, 203.  
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and secondary legislation). At least at the point of application by European 
courts, the collision between these norms in the courts is resolved more in 
accordance with universal values such as dignity or administrative justice, 
than others, such as security. From this observation, the more general idea is 
drawn that universal ratio is the product of contestation when bodies (such 
as the CJEU) refuse to compromise on matters concerning fundamental 
rights. This refusal, and the values that underpin it, as time has shown, were 
not able to be fully ignored by the Sanctions Committee, not least because 
to do so would create a hole in the Committee’s sanctions net. For instance, 
and in response to the judgments of European courts, the Committee has 
now appointed an ombudsperson to consider the evidence of those listed.48 
The point is, though, that ratio emerges from another word Walker uses: 
‘challenge’. And by this, the words ‘resistance’ and ‘dissent’ might be even 
more appropriate.  
 
Thus, in Kadi, the CJEU rightly determined that the actions of the 
governments of states parties to enforce the listing by the Sanctions 
Committee of Kadi were illegal. The Court should refuse to accept a failure 
of those states to adhere to basic principles of the rule of law and 
fundamental human rights even in pursuance of the security objectives of 
the Sanctions Committee. But this form of refusal, resistance, or dissent is 
how  a ‘preponderance of ratio’ emerges from the pluralistic global legal 
order, as Walker maintains it does. Put another way, it is an instrumentally 
rational way by which the institutional structure of the ‘existing institutional 
configuration’ may move the global legal order to a higher ‘stage of 
authority’, to use Alan Brudner’s phrase.49 Resistance within the pluralistic 
institutional structure of global law is a motor by which it moves from forms 
of authority claim which are based upon de jure (mere rule governed) 
authority, to forms of authority in which each citizen is recognised as free 
and equal under law as members of a global society. Dissent can be 
achieved through a number of means, but the emergent doctrine of 
proportionality seems a fruitful way forwards, to the extent that it requires a 
body to show some deference or restraint to a primary decision-taker (who 
                                                          
48 See M de Goede and G Sullivan, ‘Between Law and the Exception: The UN1267 
Ombudsperson as a Hybrid Model of Legal Expertise’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 833. 
49 A Brudner, Constitutional Goods (OUP, 2004) and Capps, note 26. See also, N Tukuler 
Isiksel, ‘Fundamental Rights in the EU after Kadi and Al-Barakaat’ (2010) 16 European 
Law Journal 551. 
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may well have, for example, greater expertise in a matter), except when 
fundamental rights are at stake.50 In sum, then, authority is accumulated by 
global administrative bodies, and those subject to then, as they demand from 
other bodies decisions that conform to universal ratio. 
                                                          
50 For Walker’s discussion of proportionality, see Intimations, 167. 
